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I. INTRODUCTION
When we think of the "founding" of the ADR movement (particularly, but
not exclusively, in law), from when do we date it? Whom do we think of as our
leaders? Many of us think of Frank Sander and the "multi-door courthouse"
suggested by his famous paper, delivered at the Pound Conference on the Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice in 1976.1 For
others, the publication of Roger Fisher and William Ury's Getting to Yes,2
signaled an interest in a changed paradigm for engaging in legal negotiations. 3
Some may associate ADR's nascency with early practical efforts to
institutionalize "warmer" 4 methods of disputing. Calling on these methods, the
* Schwartz Lecture on Dispute Resolution at The Ohio State University College of Law,
delivered April 13, 2000.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Chair, Georgetown-CPR
Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR. Thanks to Josh Stulberg, Nancy Rogers, the
editors of The Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, and The Ohio State College of Law
ADR programs for their invitation and on-going work and excellence in our field. Special
thanks to my superb research assistant, Meredith Weinberg.
1 Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Delivered at the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 111, 111 (1976).
2 RoGER FISHER & WIaLAM URY, GETrING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WrrHOUT
GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed. 2d ed., 1991).
3 Of course, I like to think my own article on legal negotiation played some role in the
increased interest in studying and teaching negotiation. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV.
754 (1984).
4 David Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J.
COMP. L. 205 (Supp. 1978).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
civil rights movement, the consumer movement, and local empowerment efforts5
all attempted to increase community participation and involvement in issues that
were linked to larger social concerns. Yet, as we date most of the modem "ADR
movement' 6 to the 1970s and 1980s, we may be failing to pay enough serious
attention to earlier "intellectual" founders of ADR-those who provided the key
ideas, concepts or organizing frameworks7 from which we have built our modem
movement of theories, practices, policies, and institutions. In this essay, I hope
to remind us of who went before, and which of their ideas helped generate our
current understandings of our field. I also will examine which of these ideas,
theories, and concepts continue robustly to influence our practices and which
might need to be modified in light of current conditions.
I will explicate some of the key concepts that form the cornerstone of our
conceptions of "appropriate dispute resolution" and trace them to their
intellectual sources. I do this because I think it is important to elaborate a
"jurisprudence of ADR," both to justify and explain the special "morality" and
"logic" of different processes of dispute resolution and to prepare us better to
defend what we are trying to accomplish against continuing critiques of what is
often perceived as a less "just" way of resolving disputes and settling cases. 8 The
5 E.g., THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY
MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (Sally E. Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993) (describing
the San Francisco Community Boards, which opened in 1976, as "one of the most prominent
examples of a form of community mediation deeply rooted in community life"); Ray
Schonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work, Structure and Guiding Principles, 5
MEDIATION Q. 3 (1984).
6 Both terms are problematic: "ADR" because it usually connotes "alternative" dispute
resolution, but is increasingly called "appropriate" dispute resolution, to reflect the fact that
most disputes and cases are dealt with outside of trial, so that full-scale litigation, in the form
of trial, is really the alternative. Albie Davis & Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain Trust the
Old-Fashioned Way-We Earn It!, 4 NEGOT. J. 55, 62 (1988) (renaming "ADR" as
"appropriate" dispute resolution). As for "movement," many of us think of ourselves as
participating in a "social movement" designed to alter both the processes of conflict
management or handling and the kinds of outcomes produced. The social movement aspects
of some of the teachings of the founders of ADR, however, have been transformed into
caseload reduction and efficiency policy mandates that have tended to bureaucratize and
pacify the more socially transformative aspects of the political movement. Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or
the "Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991).
7 In this essay, I am primarily interested in our more recent "intellectual" history, as
contrasted to the much longer history of ADR practices. E.g., JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE
WITHOUT LAW? (1983); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We Do When
Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1613 (1997).
8 E.g., Owen M. iss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995); Carrie Menkel-
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relation of dispute processes to the larger project of explicating a theory of law
in jurisprudential terms remains to be completed. 9 Ours has been an eclectic field
intellectually, and we have used, borrowed, and elaborated on ideas that have
come to us from many different fields, not only from law and legal theory, but
from anthropology, sociology, international relations, social and cognitive
psychology, game theory and economics, and most recently, political theory.
Like any new field, we can ask if we have an intellectual core or canon of our
own, whether we need one, or whether we are, in fact, stronger or more robust
because we do straddle so many different fields. As one who believes deeply in
multi-disciplinary study and multi-causal explanations of social behavior, I think
our field of "ADR" or conflict resolution is richer for its multiple sources of
insights and sensitivity to the interactive effects of law and legal institutions with
other social institutions. If our field's purpose is to provide fair, just, and more
harmonious solutions to human problems, then we will not easily be cabined to
teachings from law and legal theory alone.
The key concepts (and their intellectual elaborators 10) that inform our efforts
to create more flexible and varied processes for dispute handling11 and more
Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of
Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995). In one sense, Plato may have
articulated one version of ADR jurisprudence. In discussing first, second, and third best
judges, he suggests that the judge who can reconcile divided parties to each other (albeit
through law) may be the best judge of all (better than those who "rule"):
Which judge] would be better: the one who destroyed the wicked among them and set
the better to ruling themselves, or the one who made the worthy men-rule and allowed
the worse to live while making them willing to be ruled? But I suppose we should also
mention the judge who is third in respect to virtue-if there should ever be such a
judge-one capable of taking over a single divided family and destroying no one, but
rather reconciling them by laying down laws for them for the rest of time and thus
securing their friendship for one another.
PLATO, THELAWS OFPLATO 6 (Thomas L. Pangle ed. & trans., Basic Books 1980); DAvID
LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 322-23 (1994).
9 For examples of some recent efforts, see STuART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE Is CONFLiCr
(2000); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, INTRODUCTION, MEDIATION: THEORY, PRACTICE AND
POLICY (forthcoming 2001). This is one of the deep jurisprudential issues that Lon Fuller
sought to address in his series of essays on process discussed infra Part IV. One could ask,
for example, what is the theory of law that includes variations of process for its
development, interpretation, and implementation? Or, does the process of dispute resolution
require theorizing outside of law and legal institutions, belonging instead to the political
philosophy and sociology of conflict?
101 am selecting a few representative intellectual founders of each concept. In many
instances, there are several theorists or researchers that have informed the development of
an idea or a cluster of concepts which have influenced the "theory" of ADR.
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tailored, just or efficient solutions to problems include "the nature and function
of conflict" that we learn from Georg Simmel, 12 Lewis Coser,13 Morton
Deutsch, 14 and Mary Parker Follett 15 via sociology, social psychology, social
work, business and public administration. Also encompassed in a broader view
of conflict are "the social and cultural contexts of disputing," as elaborated by
Laura Nader and other anthropologists and socio-legal scholars.16 The functional
and moral variations of different dispute processes are developed by Lon
Fuller, 17whom I have dubbed the "jurisprude of ADR,"' 8 and Soia
Mentschikoff. 19 Differences in the "quality of outcomes" produced by different
processes have been studied and theorized by Vilfredo Pareto,20 George
Homans,21 and more recently, Robert Axelrod.22 The social psychology of
strategic processes and decision making are explored by game theorists and
II I prefer this term to "dispute or conflict management or resolution," which assume
that the disputes and conflicts will be finally put down or ended, when, in reality, conflict
may continue in a different form or may be "productive" in some way so that it should not
be squelched.
12 GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT (Kurt H. Wolff et al. trans., 1955).
13 LEWIS COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1964).
14 MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE
PROCESSES (1973); CONFLICT, COOPERATION AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS INSPIRED BY THE WORK
OF MORTON DEUTSCH (Barbara Benedict Bunker et al. eds., 1995); THE HANDBOOK OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Morton Deutsch & Peter Coleman eds.,
2000).
15 MARY PARKER FOU.ET, PROPHET OF MANAGEMENT: A CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS
FROM THE 1920s (Pauline Graham ed., 1996).
16 E.g., THE DISPUTING PROCESS-LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (Laura Nader & Harry Todd
eds., 1978); P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURALPERSPECIVE
(1979); KEVIN AVRUCH, CULTURE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1998); Richard Abel, A
Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 217 (1973).
17 LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981).
18 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REV.
407, 449 (1997).
19 Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance ofArbitration, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 699
(1952); Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961).
20 E.g., VIFREDO PARETO: SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS (S.E. Finer ed., 1966).
21 GEORGE CASPAR HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS
(1961) (teaching the important lesson that human beings often have complementary, not
competing needs, and can therefore achieve "trades" that make both parties better off,
following trades and negotiations, than they would be without such interactions).
22 ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); see also ROBERT
M. AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION
AND COLLABORATION (1997).
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decision scientists, like Howard Raiffa23 and social and cognitive
psychologists. 24 The structure of and effectiveness of institutionalization of
different processes was initially described by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks25 and
the "legal process" theorists of the 1950s and now informs the work of a number
of scholars, focused on a "new" legal process26 approach to dispute resolution
and problem solving, including modem democratic discourse theorists (Jurgen
Habermas,27 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson28) and their application to a
variety of new dispute resolution processes. 29 My purposes in briefly reviewing
the major intellectual contributions of this widely diverse and somewhat arbitrary
group of social theorists and empiricists to our field is to illuminate where we
have come from so we can both understand and remember our philosophical
roots and so we can extend their theories and examine their applicability to
today's concerns about fair and just treatments of disputes and conflicts, at
individual, group, nation-state, and international levels.
2 3 HowARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OFNEGOTIATION (1982); JOHN HAMMOND
ET AL, SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING BETTER DECISIONS (1998).
2 4 E.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (1982); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
25 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKNG AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994).
261 am going to distinguish here "new legal process" in the institutionalization of
dispute processes and their justification from what Ed Rubin has tried to claim as a "new
legal process" school in the empirical study and conceptualization ofthe "new micro-
institutionalism" of legal institutions. See e.g., Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process,
The Synthesis of Discourse and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393
(1996); see also Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 521
(1997).
2 7 JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
OFLAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
2 8 Amy GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996);
DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Stephen Macedo ed.,
1999); JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURAISM, COMPLEXrrY AND DEMOCRACY
(1996); MARK KNGwELL, A CIVL TONGUE: JUSTICE, DIALOGUE AND THE POLMCS OF
PLURALISM (1995).
29 E.g., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING
AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999); A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CONSENSUS (Jim
Arthur et al. eds., 1999); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in
ETHICS IN PRACTICE (Deborah Rhode ed., 2000); Innovations in Process: New Applications
in ADR, DISP. RESOL MAG., Summer 1998, at 4-27.
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II. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND
CREATIVE CONFLICT
In the law, we tend to call our field "dispute resolution," which connotes its
origins in cases and disputes30 or "trouble cases," as the legal anthropologists call
it. In fact, dispute resolution is situated in a broader intellectual space of the
sociology or philosophy of the role of conflict.31 While many in the ADR field
think of conflict as a problematic aspect of human life, requiring "resolution" or
"management," many social theorists prefer to see conflict as variable:
sometimes "destructive," but sometimes "constructive" or even creative, ever an
opportunity for learning and growth. The sociologists Georg Simmel and Lewis
Coser argued that conflict can be a very positive social force that prevents
stagnation, stimulates curiosity and learning, "airing" of problems, and the search
for new solutions at both individual and social levels. Conflict can help forge
identity and cohesiveness (especially when threatened from without) and can
help identify what is really important. Working with both individual and social
conflicts helps articulate and test what norms and rules should be applied to
situations32 and successful "negotiation" through conflict makes both individuals
and groups stronger by demonstrating survival and flexibility skills and
permitting continuity. Building on this work, which treats conflict not as a
"negative" but as a "variable," social psychologist Morton Deutsch, among
30 William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming and Claiming..., 15 LAW& Soc'Y REv. 631 (1980-81) (describing the
social construction of dispute occurrences, recognition, definitions, attributions, and
variations in claiming behavior).
31 For a recent and eloquent statement of the importance of conflict in any
philosophically just society, see generally HAMPSHIRE, supra note 9, suggesting that
substantive conflict can never be eliminated in a diverse society. Hampshire argues that what
we can agree about is procedural fairness in the treatment of conflicts, where the "two" sides
to any conflict are granted a fair hearing and procedures are sufficiently acceptable to those
to whom they are meant to apply. I agree with much of Hampshire's statements about the
relation of conflict to justice, except that, in my view, conflicts are not only two-sided. He
seems to import an unquestioned acceptance of the Anglo-American adversary system as an
ideal form of procedural fairness. For my critique of these assumptions, see Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996) (suggesting that modem disputes have multiple issues and
multiple parties and are not simply "two-sided").
32 Remember that in one of the first law review articles on negotiation, Melvin
Eisenberg argued that even transactional negotiations were norm-creating, just as much as
litigation-based dispute negotiations were. See generally Melvin Eisenberg, Private
Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637
(1976).
[Vol. 16:1 2000]
THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDERS OF ADR
others, has developed a taxonomy of different kinds of conflicts, allowing us to
see that with variability of structure and function, there can also be variability of
approaches to conflict handling. Social psychological models of conflict
categorize on the basis of type of dispute33 and on the perceptions or relations of
the parties (i.e., do the parties see things the same way or differently, are there
multiple parties, other constituents, is there an on-going relation, is the conflict
manifest or latent, direct or misattributed).34
Even before these discussions of the social function of conflict, Mary Parker
Follett, one of the leading "mothers, '35 of invention in ADR talked about
"constructive conflict" in the context of organizational and labor disputes.
Serving as the inspiration for many early practitioners of recent ADR,3 6 Mary
Parker Follett trained as a political scientist, then used her knowledge first in
social work and then in organizational management and international affairs. She
lectured frequently in personnel management contexts and was interested in how
groups, using principles of democratic governance, could work together and
produce better outcomes than hierarchically produced orders. Participation,
constructive conflict, creativity, circular responses, and integrative behavior-the
principles to which Follett devoted her life-are the touchstones of much of what
we teach and hope to accomplish in good dispute resolution environments.
Follett often spoke enthusiastically about the functions of conflict, and in one of
my favorite passages, she says:
As conflict-difference-is here in the world, as we cannot avoid it, we
should, I think use it. Instead of condemning it, we should set it to work for us.
Why not? What does the mechanical engineer do with friction? Of course, his
chief job is to eliminate friction, but it is true that he also capitalizes friction.
The transmission of power by belts depends on friction between the belt and
33 What I have called the "res" of the dispute is a thing, a feeling or understanding, a
relationship, a value conflict. Must the "res" or thing be divided (is it a scarce resource) or
can it be shared in some way? Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of
Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AM. B. FOuND. RES. J. 905, 927.
3 4 DEuTscH, supra note 14, at 11-17.
3 5 For some of us, it is heartening to discover that the idea of "integrative" solutions to
situations of conflict, in fact, originated with a woman. As in many other fields of endeavor,
some of the "fathers" got the credit they might not have wholly deserved. For instance, in
their classic book on labor-management negotiations, Richard Walton and Robert McKersie
discussed and cited Follett's work, but they seem to have walked off with the credit for the
idea. See generally RICHARD WALTON & ROBERT MCKERSIE, A BEHAvIORAL THEORY OF
LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965); Deborah Kolb, The Love for Three Oranges Or: What Did We
Miss About Ms. Follett in the Library?, 11 NEG. J. 339 (1995).
3 6 Albie M. Davis, An Interview with Mary Parker Follett, 5 NEGOT. 3. 223 (1989).
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the pulley.... The music of the violin we get by friction.... We talk of the
friction of mind on mind as a good thing. So in business too, we have to know
when to try to eliminate friction and when to try to capitalize it, when to see
what work we can make it do. That is what I wish to consider here, whether we
can set conflict to work and make it do something for us.37
For Follett, there were three ways conflict was dealt with: domination,
compromise, or integration. She urged integration as a process where new
solutions would emerge from parties trying to meet their desires without the
compromise of having to give up something.38 It is her story we often tell when
we describe integrative solutions, when she was one of two readers in a library,
arguing about an open window. She wanted the window closed because of a
draft; the other patron wanted fresh air; the solution was to open a window in
another room for indirect air to circulate. 39 In her view, the likelihood of
integrative solutions, in which parties do not necessarily have to give anything
up, are increased by bringing differences out into the open, facing the conflicts
and underlying desires, evaluating and re-valuing desires and preferences when
the other parties' desires are made known, and looking for solutions in which the
"interests may fit into each other."40 Follett was undoubtedly an optimistic
person believing that such mutual interests could be found, but she also thought
that by uncovering real interests we would be able to distinguish "the significant"
from "the dramatic" (perhaps another way of understanding the notion of looking
to the interests behind the positions). She urged a series of very practical
solution-seeking moves that are remarkably robust to this day and now serve as
the model for suggestions about how to solve legal problems and seek creative
solutions. She suggested "disaggregation" of problems (making them smaller),
by looking at their constituent elements, what is often referred to as "breaking up
the whole." She also suggested that sometimes, the opposite could be true; that
we should search for the "whole demand-the real demand" which might be
37 FOLLETT, supra note 15, at 67-68.
38 Thus, she held similar views to those of us who say that negotiation, mediation, and
other forms of ADR are not about compromise. See generally John Coons, Compromise As
Precise Justice, in COMPROMISE IN ETHIcs, LAW AND POLICS 190 (J. Roland Pennock &
John Chapman eds., 1979); MENKEL-MEADOW, supra note 9; John Coons, Approaches to
Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REV. 750
(1964).
39 FOLuz, supra note 15, at 69; FISHER & URY, supra note 2, at 40. She is also often
credited with the orange story where one person desires the orange, the other the peel. Kolb,
supra note 35, at 339; see also her description of the argument between dairy farmers about
unloading on a platform that was reconfigured to support both of them, FoLLETr, supra note
15, at 69-70.
40 Fo =, supra note 15, at 75.
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obscured by miscellaneous minor claims.41 Follett anticipated the scripted
negotiation plans of today, as well as the complex "webs" of "polycentric"
disputes42 by suggesting that the good conflict manager would "anticipate"
responses and recognize that every action by oneself set off a reaction in the
other that one would then respond to; in other words, our actions and responses
are all "circular" or "interdependent" in today's language. Follett suggested that
we are equally responsible for anything that happens as a result of setting in
motion our own actions and responses to our own actions.43 Follett believed that
we hurt ourselves whenever we see ourselves "imprisoned" in an "either-or
situation,"44 urging people to look for solutions that were better than the two
obvious alternatives. Because "integrative" solutions require innovation and
imagination, she believed (and preached) dynamic, participative and creative
problem solving. Those in business administration and management who are
looking at consensus building, participatory leadership, and joint venture models
of economic decisionmaking are currently appreciating Follett's work.45
Part of the attraction of her work is that Follett wrote and spoke clearly and
simply. She was one of the first to successfully marry theory and practice, for she
had a firm belief that it was only through the experience of achieving integrative
solutions that people could fully understand that achievement; understanding
(like Weber's verstehen) had to be "knitted into the structure of [one's very]
being."46 She saw that solutions to negotiated problems and conflicts would
emerge from relationships and interconnected interaction, not from top-down
force or artificially imposed ideas or concepts.
This mother of invention saw clearly in the 1920s that there were better ways
to make use of conflict-to embrace it and to use it for more creative and
innovative solutions, 47 in addition to the purpose of making more peace or better
41 FoLLETr, supra note 15, at 79. Many of these useful and concrete suggestions for
seeking integrative solutions, including contingent solutions and conditional agreements,
have been elaborated in DAvID LAX & JAMEs SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN (1986) and MAX H. BAZERMAN &
MARGARET NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 89-101 (1992).
4 2 Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAi. L. REv. 305 (1971).
4 3 FOLETF, supra note 15, at 81.
44Though she did not operate in the legal system, she did work in another adversarial,
"two-sided" environment-labor relations.
45 E.g., FOLL.ET, supra note 15, at 87; John Child, Organizational Structure,
Environment and Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice, 6 Soc. 1 (1972).
46 Davis, supra note 36, at 227.
4 7 For a recent effort to reintroduce these ideas into creative legal problem solving, see
generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and
Teachable in Legal Education?, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
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processes (though she believed in those things too). Follett saw better, more
satisfying and longer lasting outcomes in integrative solutions that were not the
result of contested and "split the difference" compromise. In this, she sought
better, more pareto-optimal solutions, like so many of the major contributors to
the ADR field.
UI1. THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF DISPUTING
It is somewhat ironic that one of the most influential "mothers" of our field
has demonstrated a complex, if ambivalent, perspective on disputing processes.
As one of the leading legal anthropologists who helped to conceptualize the
study of disputes and legal systems as one of the most important constituent
elements of a society, Laura Nader described and valorized the mediational
practices of the Zapotec Indians she studied in Talea, Mexico. 48 There, she
demonstrated how a closely knit and isolated community drawing on its needs
for internal harmony and solidarity created a mediation-like dispute resolution
process.49 Some years later (and at one of the Schwartz lectures at The Ohio
State University College of Law), Nader denounced American "deformations"
of informal disputing processes where "pacification" and the desire for peace
were seen to be in opposition to the achievement of justice through confrontation
in the courts.50
Like other legal anthropologists who seem to venerate American forms of
legalism when they are home,51 Nader reminds us that disputing processes are
48 LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC
MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (1990); see also LITTLE INJUSTICES: LAURA NADER LOOKS AT THE LAW
(Odyssey Films, PBS Video, 1980).
49 In a pathbreaking empirical study of disputing within an American context, law and
economics scholar Robert Ellickson demonstrated how closely interdependent neighbors
(cattle ranchers in a remote California county) evolved cooperative dispute resolution
mechanisms as well as their own substantive rules, outside of the formal institutions and
directions of substantive law. Ellickson's empirical study demonstrated, to his surprise, the
"trumping" of both formal law and law and economics theories (the Coase Theorem) by
norms of social cooperation (now called "social norm theory"). ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).50 Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
1 (1993); see also Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion-The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal
Reform, 8 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 269 (1988).
51 E.g., RICHARD ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1982); SALLY MERRY,
GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS
AMERICANS (1990). Cf William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on
Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 63, 86 (1974) (suggesting that we need more field
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intimately tied to the culture in which they are situated. Legal regimes both
constitute and are constitutive of the cultures in which they are embedded and
the way people "process" conflicts and disputes tells us a great deal about what
their culture values. Disputing institutions will reflect the culture's values, and
it may not be wise to attempt to transplant a form of disputing that is not
indigenous to or compatible with a different culture. Legal anthropologists see
variation and are interested in comparisons, as well as processes of change; they
are less inclined to see universal or uniform structures that can be made to work
in quite the same way in different cultural settings. 52 Thus, in her later work,
Nader denounces court ADR programs as efforts to import a non-American form
of mediation to manage and divert important legal cases from the docket. Nader
is particularly concerned that settlement, mediation, and the secrecy which often
accompanies them will prevent important facts from becoming publicly known,
in a culture that prizes public knowledge, class action lawsuits, precedents and
punishment, perhaps more than it values peace and harmony.53 In Nader's
analysis, the American ADR movement was captured by a coercive ideology and
court administrative hierarchy that sought to diminish caseloads at a time of
expanding legal rights for the disempowered.
Nader reminds us that methods of dispute resolution, in all of its forms, are
not neutral-they are designed and implemented by parties, court administrators
or governments with substantive agendas. Thus, we must always interrogate the
studies of American dispute resolution institutions to compare to what has been studied in
"foreign" sites, from where most dispute theory has been derived).
52 See generally CLIFFORD GEERTz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (2d ed. 2000); AVRUCH, supra note 16; MARK H. Ross, THE
MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT: INTERPRETATIONS AND INTERESTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(1993). For a rigorous attempt to analyze the comparative universals and differences in
dispute resolution institutions, both in time (history) and place (culture), see generally
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND PoLITICAL ANALYsIs (1981).
53 Nader has studied American consumer disputes, as well as disputes in other cultures,
by receiving reports of consumer complaints from hundreds of letters obtained from her
consumer advocate brother, Ralph Nader. Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law,
88 YALE L.J. 998, 1003 (1979). It was the dogged investigative and litigative efforts of
Ralph Nader that produced evidence of design defects in the Chevrolet Corvair, responsible
for many automobile deaths. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN
DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965); Jonathan Rabinovitz, Nader's Museum
of Liability: Corvairs, Pintos and Implants, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1998, at Al (observing
Ralph Nader's efforts to reveal "design flaws of the Chevrolet Corvair and other
automobiles"); Stuart Diamond, Warren Anderson: A Public Crisis, A Personal Ordeal,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 19, 1985, at 1 (noting that "General Motors responded to consumer
advocate Ralph Nader's discovery of safety problems with the [Chevrolet] Corvair by
initiating a personal attack against Mr. Nader").
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purposes for which a process of dispute resolution is being invoked. How did this
particular institution come to be? What values does it serve? Who is achieving
what with the particular structure of the system in place? In dispute resolution,
power will be located somewhere, and there are consequences to who possesses
and controls it and how that power will be exercised.54 For Nader, there is
always the danger that externally imposed dispute resolution systems (whether
imposed by American judges or legislators in domestic situations55 or "rule of
law" legal institutions or American-style arbitration in "foreign countries") are
designed to "colonize" or "control" those who would have disputes or conflicts,
either with each other or with the state or other official "regimes." Attempts to
"universalize" or "globalize" 56 legal procedures or dispute resolution systems
(such as in international or multi-national regimes) will either run roughshod
over specific community or nation-state practices or be seen for what they are-
conflict resolution by "domination."
Nader's attention to the social and cultural situatedness of dispute resolution
has resonated with a number of critics of ADR, both about mediation and
arbitration, usually in their compulsory or mandatory forms. Thus, where
mediation is thought to be designed to provide flexible, future-oriented solutions,
critics point out that in cases of divorce, wronged and financially less secure
women may be manipulated to compromise and give up too much.57 Similarly,
others have argued that without the protection of the "rule of law" and the
54 For a more recent application of these theories and questions on attempts to negotiate
nuclear waste storage on American Indian lands, see generally Laura Nader & Jay Ou,
Anthropological Perspectives: Idealization and Power: Legality and Tradition in Native
American Law, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 13 (1998).
55 Nader does not see the client empowerment and choice agenda promoted by many
proponents of multi-door courthouses and court-annexed ADR. Sander, supra note 1.
Instead she sees a deliberate plan to turn back the rights revolution of the 1960s in Supreme
Court Justice Warren Burger's embrace of ADR as a docket clearing device. Warren Burger,
Agenda for 2000 A.D.: A Need for Systematic Anticipation, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23-25 (A. Leo Levin & Russell
Wheeler eds., 1979); Warren Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62.
56 Nader argues that globalization is not new; the colonial powers all sought
globalization of their interests and cultures. What is new is American globalization and
institutional imperialism. Laura Nader, Comments, 46 AM. J. CoM,. L. 751,754 (1998). See
generally THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE
(1999).
57 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE LJ.
1545, 1603 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on
Mediation, Inequality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1413, 1420 (1997). Contra
Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARiz. L. REv. 467, 492-93 (1991);
Joshua Rosenberg et al., Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings & Proposals, 26 U.S.F.
L. REv. 343, 390 (1992).
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formality of the courtroom, racial and ethnic minorities58 as well as the
economically disadvantaged59 will be taken advantage of by the more
contextually powerful within the informal settings of ADR. Though she is not
the only one, Nader's political and anthropological critique has provided an
important standard against which to measure whether justice is being
compromised in the quest for other values, like peace, harmony, or simple
caseload reduction. Nader also reminds us that comparative law and legal
anthropology studies may not tell us the same things. Legal scholars tend to
export their concepts, like courts, mediation, and dispute resolution, and measure
them against or compare them to an ethnocentrically developed model;60 while
anthropologists are more likely to see the variations, not only in institutions, but
in nomenclature and purpose.61
IV. THE FUNCTIONAL AND MORAL NTEGmrIy OF DISPUTE
PROCESSES
If dispute resolution systems have social and cultural variations, Lon Fuller
and Soia Mentschikoff (among other legal theorists of both the legal realism and
legal process schools) argued that each dispute resolution process has its own
particular function, purpose, morality, and integrity. In many ways, Lon Fuller
remains the only legal philosopher to take theorizing about dispute resolution
processes seriously. Like his intellectual executor, Kenneth Winston, 62 I believe
5 8 MtcHaE HERMANN ET AL, THE MEOCOURT PROjECr FINAL REPORT, at x (1993);
Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1396; Gary LaFree & Christine
Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated
and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 767, 789 (1996).
5 9 ABEL, supra note 51, at 3.
601 have argued elsewhere that American mediation can be seen as an ethnocentrically
biased approach which privileges talk and psychological and interpersonal problem solving
over reticence or other forms of dispute resolution. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways
of Mediation: The Transformations of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices, 11
NEGOT. J. 217,223 (1995).
61 Laura Nader, A Comparative Perspective on Legal Evolution, Revolution, and
Devolution, 81 MICH. L. REv. 993, 995-97 (1983).
62 FULLER, supra note 17, Introduction, at 12. A few other scholars have made the
connection between Fuller's legal philosophy and dispute resolution theory. See, e.g.,
STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JusTcE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 47 (1988); Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the
False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U.
L. REv. 1273, 1275 (1995); Alfred W. Meyer, To Adjudicate or Mediate: That is the
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that Fuller was interested in the differences among the different legal processes
because he practiced law (during World War II with the law firm of Ropes and
Gray in Boston) and continued to serve as an arbitrator, even after resuming
teaching and scholarship at Harvard. Because he was a "reflective
practitioner," 63 who enjoyed lawyering and thought that lawyers were socially
useful,64 as well as a thoughtful scholar who recognized the different modalities
of argument, decision, and action in different legal fora, Fuller was able to
attempt a detailed analysis of the particular moralities of the different processes
he wrote about, including adjudication, arbitration, mediation, legislation,
contract, and managerial direction. 65 In his expositions of the "essentials" of each
of these processes he has been labeled a "secular natural law" theorist, because
of his attributions of an almost theological purity to each of the separate legal
processes.
For Fuller, different case types, parties and particular needs led, logically, if
not inexorably, to a particular legal process. 66 Each kind of legal process had its
own internal structure, logic, and even an essential morality. In this, Fuller was
an essentialist 67 and a legal moralist. While many of his statements about and
definitions of these processes remain classic in their analytic purity and rigidity,
they can, in some respects, help us take stock of the dispute resolution field and
how it has evolved. As the scope and breadth of dispute resolution has become
more complicated and has developed moralities of its own,68 Fuller's
Question, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 357, 367 (1993); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage
in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 843-44 (1985).
63 DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN
ACTION (1983); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Donald Schdn, The Reflective Practitioner, and
the Comparative Failures of Legal Education, 6 CUNIcALL. REV. 401, 412 (2000).
64 David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801,
801 (1998).
65 In some versions he added elections and lotteries as other "legal processes." Kenneth
I. Winston, Introduction to PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 17 at 27.
66 In this, I believe he was closer to the structural functionalism of the American
sociology of the 1950s than others would allow. E.g., TALcOTr PARSONS, ON INSTITUTIONS
AND SOCIALEVOLUTION 106-114 (Leon H. Mayhew ed., 1982). Contra Kenneth I. Winston,
Introduction to PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 17 at 31 (Winston separates
Fuller's conceptions of legal institutions from sociological "functionalism"); Bone, supra
note 62, at 1313 n.152. See generally RETHINKING PROGRESS: MOVEMENTS, FORCES AND
IDEAS AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY (Jeffrey C. Alexander & Piotr Sztompka
eds.,1990).
67 "Our task is to separate the tosh from the essential." Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 356 (1978).
68 Whether ADR processes actually require their own moralities in the form of formal
ethical rules is a subject on which I have spilled much ink. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
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pronouncements on the internal integrity of each process may no longer compel
us with the persuasive force they once had.
Lon Fuller was particularly interested in patterns of social ordering in which
law provided a basic structure of empowering laws (procedural or adjectival law)
that helped institutions develop substantive or "restraining" rules, which, in turn,
permitted society to function. Fuller wanted to call the phenomenon in which he
was interested eumonics, or "the science, theory, or study of good order and
workable social arrangements. ' 69 For Fuller, law was a "problem solving
activity" purposively directed towards enabling voluntary transactions and
contracts, preventing violence, defining ideals and standards for civic
participation, as well as providing a means for settling disputes and preserving
social harmony. Law was enacted in and enforced by a variety of different legal
institutions, which is why some commentators refer to him as concerned, above
all else, with "problems of institutional design," 70 or as an "architect of social
structure." 71 Fuller saw that lawmaking and rulemaking occurred in the realms
of private ordering-negotiating contracts and mediating solutions produced as
much "law" as the public institutions of couits and legislatures. In his efforts to
elaborate the different structures, functions, and moralities of different legal
processes, Fuller wrote the first description of, and most sustained argument for,
mediation. He said that this conciliatory process, which did not require a decision
of state-made law, would "reorient the parties to each other" and "brin[g] about
a more harmonious relationship between the parties, whether this be achieved
through explicit agreement, through a reciprocal acceptance of 'social norms'
relevant to their relationship or simply because the parties have been helped to
a new and more perceptive understanding of one another's problems." 72 For
Fuller, as for other theorists of mediation, its principal functional strength lay in
its release of the parties "from the encumbrances of rules and of accepting,
instead, a relationship of mutual respect, trust and understanding that will enable
them to meet shared contingencies without the aid of formal prescriptions laid
Ethics in Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of
Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 407,408 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary
Practice, 10 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 631, 658 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and
Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 153, 163-67 (1999).
69 Kenneth I. Winston, Introduction to PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 17 at
14.
70 Id. at 13, 31.
71 Luban, supra note 64, at 817.
72 Fuller, supra note 42, at 308.
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down in advance." 73 Mediation, in Fuller's words, is for "the administration and
enforcement of rules or social norms"74 between parties, not for the creation of
state-made law.
Fuller's functionalist definition of mediation, as being confined to either the
improvement or termination of relationships (he focused on collective
bargaining, divorce, and other familial relations and long-term business
contracts), remains an important strand in the current justification of mediation
which either assumes a long-term relationship between the parties, or hopes that
even a single conflictual encounter can be transformed into an event of "mutual
recognition, understanding, and empowerment. '75 Whether mediation ought to
be confined to particular kinds of disputes or whether it can be used in any form
of conflict or dispute remains a much debated question today.76
Lon Fuller, as the leading jurisprudential thinker about ADR, as well as a
legal pluralist, recognized that different kinds of disputes required different kinds
of processes and that processes themselves might be limited in their
appropriateness for certain human activities. For Fuller, each process of
decisionmaking, or as he preferred to say, "problem solving"77 had its own logic,
morality, and function. Fuller acknowledged that not all legal disputes or social
problems were similarly structured. Where a problem was like a "spider web" in
which unraveling one thread of a "polycentric" problem (such as deciding a
single legal issue in a web of relationships such as occurred in a factory among
labor and management or in a marriage) might destroy the whole web, mediation,
with its ability to work on many issues at the same time and focus the parties on
their relationship concerns, would be better.78
Fuller's prescient essay on the functional logic of mediation as a process of
relationship recommitment and reorientation in situations which would be
inappropriate for adjudication is less accurate when it comes to the structure of
disputes. Fuller wrote that mediation worked best with dyadic conflicts, and he
failed to anticipate the extensive use of mediation processes in complex multi-
party disputes like environmental matters, resource allocations, mass torts, or
complex commercial disputes with insurers present. Fuller also seems somewhat
73 Id. at 325-26.
7 4 Id. at 328.
7 5 ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 94-95 (1994).
76 Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 50 (1994) (presenting a
taxonomy for deciding which dispute process is appropriate for particular purposes).
77 Letter from Lon L. Fuller to a Colleague at Harvard Law School (1972), in THE
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 17, at 125.
78 Fuller, supra note 42, at 326.
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contradictory about the role of "lawmaking" in mediation when he asserts that
mediation is for administration and enforcement of laws and not for "state"
lawmaking, while simultaneously recognizing that the process of mediation
"enables the parties to work out their own rules. The creation of rules [such as
in the labor-management relation] is a process that cannot itself be rule-
bound .... ,"79 Mediation, then, is a site for private lawmaking, or, in Fuller's
terms, "rnlemaking" which, when developed from sufficient mutual trust
between the parties, will not require drawing on the formal contract.
Fuller saw mediation as internally justified by its orientation to the parties'
relationships, and it is their mutuality, consent, and reciprocity that guides the
process and legitimates it. If there is an external justification for mediation in
Fuller's conception, it is that mediation is essentially a private process between
a third party facilitator and two parties already in a relationship or trying to make
a relationship work. Thus, Fuller's conception supports the claims of those
mediation proponents who seek to keep mediation voluntary, consensual,
facilitative, and non-evaluative.80
On the other hand, Fuller's jurisprudence is sufficiently protean that he
recognized the existence, if not the full value, of what we currently refer to as
"mixed processes" which render the structure of mediational processes far more
complex and have led to our current debates about the forms of techniques and
"evaluations" in mediation. He observed mixed models of negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration, with "threats" of adjudication, at the War Labor
79 In his essay on the limits of adjudication, Fuller notes that the American Arbitration
Association "strives to keep its arbitrators from assuming the role of mediators," so that they
will not confuse claims of rights from the kind of relationship readjustment that is the
mainstay of mediation. Fuller, supra note 67, at 370; see also Fuller, supra note 42, at 326.
80 Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 937, 938 (1997).
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Board during World War II. He recognized the teachings of his Legal Process
school colleagues, Henry M. Hart (not to be confused with H.L. A. Hart!) and
Albert Sacks81 that multiple procedures of "institutional settlement" (including
various forms of legal decisionmaking) "enriched the routes to social ordering"
and made them more "flexible by various mixed forms." 82
Yet Fuller's work is still best known for seeking to elucidate the particular
moralities of particular process modalities. Fuller's strength as a theorist of
process is that he fully elaborated the structures and functions and the "internal"
moralities of each of the legal processes he studied. He gave us what probably
still is the deepest and most "classic" statement of what mediation is. However,
perhaps because he was somewhat encumbered by the structuralist-functionalist
schools of both social science and the legal process school of jurisprudence of
the 1950s and 1960s, structure and function were seldom rearranged or allowed
to "mix" in his work on social ordering. Today's "hybrid" processes combine the
structures of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration to attempt to perform a wide
variety of functions, from relationship reorientation to dispute settlement to
conflict resolution to administrative rulemaking and public policy
decisionmaking. It would be fascinating to see what Lon Fuller would make of
81 HART & SACKS, supra note 25.
82 LON L. FULLER, Irrigation and Tyranny, in PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER supra note
17, at 200. In this piece, Fuller presciently sees the modem environmental mediation:
"Problems concerned with the sharing of water supplies and the joint utilization of river
systems are inherently unsuited to adjudicative solution, involving as they do a complex
interplay of diverse interests." Id. at 210. Although Fuller saw modem administrative law
in the management of water issues, much of what he says in this article anticipates the
coordination of "joint utilization" in many modem environmental mediations.
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these more flexible procedural institutions as the modem world of social ordering
develops increasing complexity and reorganizes structures to meet the
requirements of different functions.
The debates represented in current controversies surrounding the use of
mediation continue the challenge that Fuller has set for us-do particular forms
of dispute resolution or problem solving institutions have their own integrity,
logic, and morality? Are the techniques, procedures, and mechanics of each
suitable only for a particular process, a particular kind of problem?83 Should
arbitrators 84 and judges85 never mediate, and mediators86 never adjudicate or
evaluate? In Fuller's views these separate processes should never be mixed:
Mediation and arbitration have distinct purposes and hence distinct
moralities. The morality of mediation lies in optimum settlement, a settlement
in which each party gives up what he values less, in return for what h& values
more. The morality of arbitration lies in a decision according to the law of the
contract. The procedures appropriate for mediation are those most likely to
uncover that pattern of adjustment which will most nearly meet the interests of
both parties. The procedures appropriate for arbitration are those which most
securely guarantee each of the parties a meaningful chance to present
arguments and proofs for a decision in his favor. Thus, private consultations
with parties, generally wholly improper on the part of an arbitrator, are an
indispensable tool of mediation. 87
In Fuller's understanding, everything about the different processes was
different: the importance of finding facts, the role of precedent (both formally
legal and in practice routines), who the third party neutral might be (including
different kinds of neutrality and legal background), and the most opportune
timing for use of the processes. Fuller believed strongly that arbitrators should
never try to mediate. There would be too much "'confusion of role,"' 88 and
clarity of role within a pure process was essential both for that process' integrity,
and for the legitimacy of whatever outcome might be reached. For
decisionmakers in adjudicative processes (whether in court or arbitration) it was
83 Sander & Goldberg, supra note 76, at 50.
84 See generally Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 15 NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. PROC. 8 (1962).
85 See generally Fuller, supra note 67, at 353.
86 Fuller, supra note 42, at 305.
87 LON L. FULLER, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL
MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 29 (Mark L. Kahn ed., 1962).
88 Id. at 33.
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central, for Fuller, that third parties be "detached" and "impartial"; in other
processes the third parties' knowledge of or embeddedness in the field might
actually be an advantage.
In his work on arbitration and adjudication, Fuller explored the importance
of decisions rendered by third party neutrals who would consider arguments and
make decisions on behalf of one party, based on reasons. Those reasons, or
agreed upon principles of law, were important to justify the particular decision
and bind people and communities together in generally accepted understandings
of what their communities valued. In this, adjudication is a public function (in
the cases for which it was appropriate), as many current critics of ADR see it.89
However, unlike many modem "litigation romanticists," 90 Fuller thought that
adjudication was not appropriate in a wide category of matters, including
"managerial" or "administrative matters," requiring deeper knowledge and an
understanding of the embedded and complex interactions of an organization or
industry. Similarly, he did not find adjudication appropriate in situations which
required "reciprocity" (i.e., marriage, business partnerships, contracts), nor in
situations in which some other process was appropriate like elections, or in some
cases, lotteries. Finally, he found adjudication unsuitable in situations that he
labeled "polycentric" disputes, where multiple parties or a multiplicity of
interests might be affected so that the binary solutions of adjudication could not
resolve all the aspects of the issue, or where "decision" on one legal issue might
unravel other interrelated issues or relationships. For Fuller, the core of
adjudication (and arbitration) consisted of the need for parties to present their
proofs (with evidence and reasoned arguments) in order to obtain decisions (by
judges) to problems requiring authoritative resolutions from someone outside of
the dispute or conflict. Adjudication is required when reasons and rationality are
required (most often in claims of right or in declarations of guilt or innocence)
and in Fuller's terms, not all human problems should be resolved in this
particular form of "rationality." 91 Adjudication, in Fuller's conception, required
the adversarial presentation of two sides of a case:
89 Fiss, supra note 8, at 1075; Bone, supra note 62, at 1298.
90 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1871, 1874-75 (1997).
91 Late in his life Fuller expressed a humanistic philosopher's concerns with the "new"
sciences of game theory being applied to judicial decisionmaking. He feared the reductionist
assumptions of economic interests and self-interested strategic behavior as the only forces
that could motivate both judges and parties:
The chief danger in any application of game theory to judicial decision-making
lies in the fact that it is essentially a theory of satisfactions that are, broadly speaking,
'economic' in nature, that is, are atomistic and individual. It is concerned with the 'pay-
off' and not with the rewards of the game itself... So judges may derive rewards from
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An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combatting this
natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which
is not yet fully known. The arguments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in
suspension between two opposing interpretations of it. While the proper
classification of the case is thus kept unresolved, there is time to explore all of
its peculiarities and nuances. 92
This assumption, that there are only two sides of a case, limits the usefulness
of adjudication in many modem cases in which there are more than two sides,
especially in modem litigation with interventions, class actions, interpleaders,
and more than one issue to be determined. In this, Fuller saw more limits than
advantages to adjudication in its capacity for social ordering in many important
contexts. He was deeply skeptical about the use of adjudication in matters of
deep social conflict, especially when social conditions might change faster than
adjudication could "process" them. He had enough foresight to understand the
development of mixed processes, such as in the wage setting processes he
observed in his years at the War Labor Board, where he witnessed hybrids of
negotiation and mediation, with threats of adjudication and some forms of med-
arb. He found these hybrids disturbing, referring to most of these processes as
"parasitic" on the purer forms. He believed that most of them would eventually
fail and fall away, by leading to unstable or contested resolutions, because the
underlying legitimacy of the form of process could inevitably be questioned post
hoc.
Fuller's questions about process integrity and morality,93 as well as
structural-functionalism, remain with us today. His focus on relationships
introduces one of the major controversies in the field: whether mediation's
collaborative efforts that transcend individual 'pay-offs.'... To see what this danger is
we need only recall that what ajudge may want (some of us are naive enough to hope
that this is what he will always want) is a decision that is just, proper, and workable.
Lon L. Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1604,
1607 (1966).
92 Fuller, supra note 67, at 383.
93 In addition to Fuller, there are others who have articulated a "morality" for particular
processes. Murray Schwartz argued for different ethical rules of candor and disclosure and
refusal to enforce substantively "unconscionable" negotiated agreements in private settings,
as distinguished from what was required in open court. Murray L. Schwartz, The
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669, 685-86 (1978). We
are now engaged in many disputes about the appropriate ethical standards to apply in
litigation, transactional work, mediation, and arbitration. See Center for Professional
Responsibility, Ethics 2000-Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Prof. Conduct,
at http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2000); see also Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (1977), available at http://www.adr.org.
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purpose is to settle disputes and solve problems, an instrumentalist concern, or
whether it is the reorientation of the parties to each other that characterizes what
mediation, in particular, offers to human conflict. Fuller, like some modern
commentators, sought to keep functions and structures separate. Some of us more
modern theorists and practitioners believe it is possible to achieve multiple
purposes or functions within more adaptive processes. Problems can be solved
and relationships may be "reoriented" within the same process. Mediation is an
"and/and," rather than an "either/or" process.
Lon Fuller, however, was not the only "parent" of process integrity. Soia
Mentschikoff, one of the first women to leave a deep imprint on legal
institutions, also argued for the particular strengths of non-adjudicative forms of
dispute resolution. This "mother" of ADR, perhaps because of her many years
serving as a Reporter on the Uniform Commercial Code, noted the procedural
analogies 94 of dispute resolution to the substantive formulations of "common
usage" and "reasonable practice, trade, or custom." For her, arbitration was an
opportunity for those within an industry to self-govern and to find solutions that
met their specific needs, instead of some generalized interests: "I think that self-
government of such groups has necessitated a system of dispute resolution
among its members and that arbitration has been chosen in preference to the
courts, just as trade-rule or custom formulation was chosen in preference to
formal legislative action." 95
Arbitration was not negotiation-it was not without rules. Mentschikoff
argued, in sharp contrast to other proponents of arbitration, that arbitration did
have rules and did utilize the rules of evidence. What arbitration does with rules
is to examine them in the context of the particular dispute and to exercise a kind
of common sense, rather than to apply an overly rigid or formal application.
Hearsay objections are made and then considered for the ultimate reliability of
the testimony offered.
Unlike Fuller, Mentschikoff actually undertook to study the variety of
dispute processes empirically and thus, in a sense, is also the "mother" of
empirical evaluation of dispute resolution. In studying a variety of trade
association forms of dispute resolution, Mentschikoff was able to develop a
taxonomy of forms of dispute resolution that included umpireal (arbitral),
adjudicative, and investigative models.96 In a highly sophisticated legal and
94 IS there a "feminist" story here? Soia Mentschikoff focused on process, as well as
substance, while Karl Llewellyn and other legal scholars and reporters focused more on the
substance of the proposed rules.
95 Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 710 (1952).
96 Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 846 (1961).
Lisa Bernstein, appropriately now located at the University of Chicago, where Mentschikoff
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sociological analysis, Mentschikoff noted a variety of factors that would
determine not only if commercial arbitration was used at all, but what form it
would take, whether it was individually initiated by contract, administered
arbitration by an outside body like the AAA or the ICC, or controlled by a trade
association. Different issues, like the need for rapid price information, foreign
trade and resale, or the quality assessment of delivered goods, militated in favor
of or against particular kinds of arbitral fora. For Mentschikoff, arbitration
clearly justified itself primarily when particularized expertise was required to be
exercised (as in the assessment of the quality of goods and reasonable price).
However, such factors as location of evidence (e.g., goods and documents) might
also determine what kind of process is used because certain fora (both arbitral
and adjudicative) are better for ordering production of documents. 97
Mentschikoff can also be seen as a student of process integrity and
variability in her detailed historical and empirical descriptions of differences
within industries and types of arbitration. Unlike the theoretical purity of Lon
Fuller's work, Mentschikoffs association with legal realism 98 caused her to be
interested in how arbitration actually worked. First, she saw it as more principled
and controlled by precedent than negotiation or mediation, which she saw as a
compromise process, requiring parties to give up parts of their claims or
demands. Second, she observed that well developed trade associations combined
arbitral fora with rules of ethics and disciplinary codes in order to develop fully
did most of her work as part of the law and behavioral science project at the University of
Chicago, is replicating this work, looking at how modem trade associations resolve their
disputes. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992).
97 In their recent work analyzing the transformations in international commercial
arbitration, Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have noted the increasing influence of
American-style litigation modes, even within the international arbitration community. YvEs
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 3-6 (1996). This
has occurred, in large measure, because of discovery rules in the American legal regime and
choice of law provisions often insisted on by American controlled companies. Id.
Mentschikoff's work previews these developments.
98 Of course, as another axis of comparison, one should note that Fuller's experience
was in labor arbitration and Mentschikoff's in commercial arbitration. These divisions of
kinds of cases are currently very much at issue as we debate the applicability of the Federal
Arbitration Act to labor and employment settings. E.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No.
99-1379). Likewise, they are at issue as we consider the legal and policy issues implicated
in the use of compulsory arbitration in both settings. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15
OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 19, 31-35 (1999).
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elaborated legal systems within the trade that tended to rely more on precedent
and principle than more ad hoc forms of arbitration (thus demonstrating
variability in the degree of self-regulated industries). 99 She also noted that the
failure to use attorneys in many trade controlled settings ensured that specific
trade oriented standards, and not general legal principles, were emphasized. The
American Arbitration Association, in contrast, provided a more ad hoc and
casual form of arbitration which was dominated by lawyers and appealed to more
general legal principles, and thus led to longer, more expensive, and more
complex hearings. Because AAA arbitration awards often required court
enforcement (as contrasted to trade enforcement), issues of procedure and
enforceability and rules and judicial role became more important. Mentschikoff
also contrasted the different forms of arbitration to other possible forms of
decisionmaking; for instance, she examined courts and argued that arbitrators
were more like jury members than judges in fact-finding and law application. In
studying different forms of arbitration, she suggested that labor arbitration was
as concerned with long-term contract interpretation as with the immediate
dispute, while commercial arbitration looked to resolve specific and particular
disputes fairly.
Like a wise and modern student of ADR, Mentschikoff refused to pronounce
on which processes were "better" than others. She was concerned with both the
caliber and quality of third party neutrals in all systems (courts, trade association
arbitration, and administered arbitration). As a legal realist and legal scholar, she
was concerned about the quality of rules and norms generated by the different
processes. On the whole, she found arbitrators to be as "rational" and norm-
based as judges, acknowledging that this could vary from case to case.
(Statistically, one might say that the two processes on average looked the same
on this dimension but that there were outliers or "tails" in both processes.)
As she and her husband, Karl Llewellyn, (and others) grappled with the
larger jurisprudential and prudential issues of laws set down (legislation) versus
norms to be evolved (custom or trade) in the drafting of the UCC, Mentschikoff
found similar issues in the relationship of fact-finding and norm development
99 Center for Public Resources, Model Arbitration Procedures and Practices, at
http://www.cpradr.org. (last visited Aug. 15, 2000) (encouraging industry developed ADR
systems (i.e., construction, franchising, employment, banking, and health care)).
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and enforcement in the variety of processes that could be used. Each process had
its uses, each its distinctive advantages and disadvantages, and each was both
structured by and, in turn, helped to structure the legal environment or culture
from where it came. There were consequences to process choices-different
processes both reflected and produced different rules and normative standards,
but it could not be said that any one process was perfect or appropriate for all
kinds of matters (even in the delimited field of commercial law). Like her
successors in the Legal Process school, Mentschikoff (and Fuller, as influenced
by his Legal Process colleagues) could see the importance and significance of
institutional variability and legitimacy in process.
V. INSTITUTIONALIZED PROCESS: THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT
PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL PROCESS
Though few have made the argument explicit, much of the current penchant
for "menus," "multi-door courthouses," and "fitting the forum to the fuss" 100 can
find its historical roots in the work of the Legal Process scholars, Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks. These scholars argued for a principle of "institutional
settlement" 101 or institutional competence or specialization-a purposive
approach to legal institutions in which Lon Fuller sometimes joined:10 2
A legal system is a system-a coordinated, functioning whole made up of
a set of interrelated, interacting parts. The solution of specific legal problems
constantly'requires an understanding of the functions and interrelationships of
more than one institutional process and frequently of several. Problems arising
in a court call for a perceptive awareness not only of what courts are for but of
what a legislature is for and sometimes also of what an administrative agency
is for and of what matters can best be left to private decision.... Lawyers at
the stage of private counseling have again and again to consider whether to
100 Here we have another case of appropriation from another "father of invention."
Maurice Rosenberg, a civil proceduralist par excellence (and eventual ADR teacher and
scholar-one of the few proceduralists to embrace ADR) is the originator of the phrase
"fitting the forum to the fuss." Sander & Goldberg, supra note 76, at 67. See generally
Maurice Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary Justice?, 21
CREIGHTON L. REV. 801 (1988) (endorsing the variability of dispute processes).
101 HART& SACKs, supra note 25, at 1.
102 For a discussion of the evolving membership of the legal scholars who contributed
to the Legal Process project, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical
and Critical Introduction to the Legal Process, in HART & SACKs, supra note 25, at li-
cxxxvi. For an argument that institutionalism was key to Fuller's "process" jurisprudence,
see Bone, supra note 62, at 1275.
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invoke the procedures of private or ofjudicial settlement or, often alternatively,
of legislative or administrative settlement. The development of these
awarenesses calls for study which comes to grips with the questions of what
each of these various processes of decision is good for and how each
interrelates and interacts with the others. 103
Hart and Sacks sought to explore the varieties of ways in which
decisionmaking is conducted in the legal system. They conceived of the legal
system broadly, including both private and public forms of social and legal
ordering. 10 4 Hart and Sacks resonate with the ADR "canon" or theory in many
ways, as they demonstrated by opening their book with an effort to explain the
necessity of "cooperation" in social life.'0 5 They spoke of "satisfying wants,"
thus employing the social welfare language that some of us 10 6 use today, and not
103 Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, Preface to the 1958 "Tentative Edition" of
HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at cxxxvii. Here I must add a personal note and thank the
"father" of many of my own inventions. Professor and former Dean David Filvaroff,
currently of the Buffalo Law School, taught me the Legal Process materials at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School, from which I believe I can date most of my academic interests,
including my work in ADR and process theory generally, civil procedure and the importance
of participatory and experiential learning in legal education. (I began and continue to teach
clinically and experientially.) Filvaroff had groups of students participate in role-plays in
which we treated the same legal problem (whether slumlordism should be made legally
actionable through common law tort or regulatory action) in several different legal
processual methods (legislative, judicial, and regulatory). Now I would add negotiated
processes to the mix and try some new hybrid variations on the classic three branches of
government-reg-neg, consensus building, mediation, and med-arb.
104 Their book and teaching approach consisted of exploring these issues through
specific legal problems to be solved. This is an important historical and pedagogical point
to remember in light of current approaches to and suggestions for looking at lawyers as
problem solvers. E.g., Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem Solvers: Keynote Address to the
AALS, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving
Pedagogy Seriously: A Response to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14 (1999).
105 Critics and historians would suggest that this optimism and focus on cooperation
exemplified the period in which this work was written-the American euphoria and
prosperity of the 1950s when we all believed in continuous economic progress and universal
"expanding pies." That may be true, but the 1950s was also the time of the Cold War and
direct adversarial engagement with a large and well-armed political foe, and it would have
been just as easy to focus on adversarialism, distributive and scarcity problems, and war and
conflict as cooperative American triumphilism.
106 1 specifically chose "needs" rather than "interests" as the concerns of parties to be
dealt with in negotiation and dispute resolution. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 794. For
some other uses of "needs" rather than "interests" theory, as applied to international conflict
resolution, see generally CONFLIcr: HUMAN NEEDS THEORY (John Burton ed., 1990). Of
course, in the real world, both needs and interests will be expressed in conflicts and disputes,
where they sometimes overlap and sometimes lead in different directions.
[Vol. 16:1 2000]
THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDERS OF ADR
the more "neutral" or economistic "interests" of some bargaining literature. They
also saw law as a "social science," concerning themselves with specifying the
conditions under which human beings could peacefully co-exist and order their
relations. They also recognized the variability of people, groups, and the
institutions humans create to achieve their goals. Hart and Sacks saw
"constitutive or procedural" understandings of people and groups as more
fundamental than the substantive understandings that a group of people must
arrive at-which is why we call it the legal "process" school. Institutionalized
patterns of procedures and processes for making rules, judging violations, and
structuring relationships are thus essential to any society which seeks to function
smoothly. The "principle of institutional settlement," then, is that every society
requires the establishment of "regularized and peaceable methods of decision"
and that decisions made through these methods should be accepted as binding
on the society "unless and until they are duly changed.' 10 7 Most importantly for
our purposes, Hart and Sacks recognized that "different procedures and
personnel of different qualifications invariably prove to, be appropriate for
deciding different kinds of questions."'108
Hart and Sacks also recognized the importance of lawyers in processes
designed to prevent disputes, by using their most creative powers 0 9 of
transaction planning and framing. In their planning of relationships and
transactions, through, for example, the drafting of contracts, wills, deeds,
constitutions, statutes, and articles of incorporation, lawyers could consider both
the creation of and application of rules, both substantive and procedural, that
govern human interactions.110 Hart and Sacks, like Fuller, were intent on
achieving recognition of the lawyer's role as "an architect of social structure,"111
in addition to the more familiar role of representative in formal'litigation. Indeed,
Hart and Sacks make among the first references to the lawyer's role as negotiator
and dispute resolver by suggesting that the lawyer's function as a "representative
107 HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at 4.
108 Id.
109 For my application of these ideas of recognizing the "creativity" in legal transaction
planning and doctrinal development, see generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 47;
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity
and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 785 (2000).
1 10 HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at 175.
111 Id. at 176. This phrase has been adapted by more recent commentators as "process
architect," "transaction cost engineer," and other similar phrases. E.g., Ronald Gilson, Value
Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J 239, 254-56
(1984); Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1, 2 (1995).
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in the private settlement of disputes without litigation" was every bit as important
as the more well-known role of the lawyer in court. To perform this function well
the lawyer needs to have "skill in anticipating the probable outcome of litigation
and so in estimating the bargaining strength of each side; skill in negotiation in
finding common ground of mutual advantage between the parties; and skill in the
formal exercise of the legal powers which make the settlement binding." 112
Hart and Sacks included private arbitration (in both the commercial and
labor contexts) as one of the legal processes that lawyers must master,1 13 while
simultaneously presaging several of the issues we hotly debate now-such as the
compulsory use of what was intended to be a voluntary and private process. Only
after review of these important processes of private ordering and "internal
dispute settlement" did Hart and Sacks canvass the more conventionally studied
legal processes of courts and common law decisionmaking, as well as legislation,
the political process, and administrative processes. 14 The use of the Legal
Process materials in American law schools for so many years, without
publication, demonstrates the transition in forms of legal process, reasoning,
problem solving, and institutional development that characterized this period of
changing boundaries between public and private law and adjudication and the
regulatory state. 115 While Hart and Sacks struggled more obviously with
legislative and administrative processes, their recognition of the importance of
private ordering and "alternative" legal processes, both in dispute settlement and
prevention, as well as in transaction and arrangement formation, has made a
112 HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at 179.
113 Id. at 304-30.
114 Even in this, Hart and Sacks radically expanded what was commonly studied in
legal education, with its almost exclusive focus on courts and judicial decisionmaking. Their
detailed attention to political processes and legislation remains one of the primary and most
complete sources of political bargaining processes in law, as contrasted to the "rational
argument" form of decision making associated with so much of legal reasoning. For more
modem applications of the differences in rational argument and bargaining models in
Constitutional and other forms of law making, see generally JON ELsTER, Strategic Uses of
Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995); JON
ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (1999); JON ELSTER,
SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS oFRATIONALITY (1989); JON ELSTER,
NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1989); CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering
the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
115 For a more recent exploration of the false dichotomies in the public-private
distinctions in the regulatory state, see generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (arguing that public and private actors
"negotiate" their roles in regulation and governance in the modem administrative state).
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major contribution to the pluralistic way in which we modem legal process
scholars and practitioners see the world.
The old Legal Process school has now given birth to several strains of "new
legal process" sensitivity, recognizing that process is pluralistic and that different
institutional arrangements of process are necessary to meet different kinds of
individual and institutional needs. In one sense, the "new legal process"
represented by ADR is a direct descendant of Hart and Sacks' Legal Process
school, recognizing a greater diversity of legal processes that are responsible for
maintaining social order. "Appropriate" dispute resolution processes recognize
a fuller menu of primary and hybrid processes, including mediation, arbitration,
med-arb, evaluative mediation, early neutral evaluation, summary jury, and judge
trials, 116 all of which reflect a combination of the primary processes of
negotiation, adjudication, and mediation in order to achieve different results
dependent on the kinds of parties, issues in dispute, or numbers of parties
involved. Fuller's recognition of a "polycentric" dispute has given way to the
realization that there are many kinds of polycentric disputes, some of which
require public fora because they will make law for many others (e.g., negotiated
rulemaking or reg-neg), 117 but some which the parties prefer to deal with
privately (e.g., the mini-trial). By "fitting the forum to the fuss," lawyers and
parties are now more sophisticated about analyzing which processes are
appropriate for particular kinds of desired outcomes or procedures.
While some have argued for a new form of "micro-institutionalism" in the
study of legal institutions, following on from the "neo-institutionalism" in the
social sciences,1 18 others that focus on process suggest that we can revivify some
of the old forms. As deliberative democracy takes hold in social theory and
political science in the theoretical work of Jurgen Habernias and the more
practical explications of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 119 process itself
has become re-enshrined as the characteristic which defines democracy and
legitimate political process. Communicative action through "ideal speech
conditions" in which people articulate their arguments, both to persuade and to
bargain 120 is thought to provide the new "glue" which will order social life and
116 Alternatives to the High Costs of Litigation, The ABCs of ADR: A Dispute
Resolution Glossary, 13 CPR INsT. FOR Disp. RE:SOL. 147, 150 (1995).
117 Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1 (1982);
Philip Harter, Fear of Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J. 1389 (1997);
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1
(1997).
118 Rubin, supra note 26, at 1393.
119 GUTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 28.
120 HABERMAS, supra note 27.
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keep widely diverse individuals together in a democratic state and a lively civic
culture. Where we cannot agree on substantive ends (the old liberal saw), we can
probably agree on processes through which we listen and try to persuade each
other. Thus, while many of these theorists would deny it, modem democratic
processes can be thought of as mediation writ large. 121 The recent
experimentation with new forms of legal and political processes has revitalized
aspects of legal and social decisionmaking that would likely hearten Hart and
Sacks. Added to the older processes of private ordering, decisional-court,
legislative and administrative processes, newer processes like "consensus
building" 122 broaden democracy's reach by involving stakeholders or interested
parties in settings that engage participation beyond voting and professional
representation. These processes encourage involvement in direct decision making
in such matters as environmental siting and preservation, municipal government
and funding, race and cultural difference issues, budgeting, socially divisive
issues like abortion and affirmative action, and formal regulation and mass tort
liability. 123 Even where specific decisions are not reached or solutions to
"problems" are not found, dialogue and discourse in the public sphere offer a
new "proceduralist" theory and practice 124 of democracy. Thus, process
pluralism is clearly an important legacy of the past that has adapted to new legal
and social conditions.
Lawyers, as consummate "proceduralists" and "process architects," have an
important role to play in the implementation of more participatory and complex
forms of process-a role which the Legal Process scholars saw as more
variegated than simply litigating or advising. 125
121 At least one model of mediation seeks just that--empowerment and recognition and
mutual respect, not necessarily producing a particular outcome or "settlement." See BUSH
& FOLGER, supra note 75, at 81-112.
12 2 THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 29.
123 It has been suggested that Judge Jackson should have constructed another type of
process in the Microsoft antitrust action when it became clear that that was a multi-party (not
two-sided) dispute. (Consider the conflicting roles of the state attorney generals juxtaposed
with the federal government's interests, in addition to the obvious interests of Microsoft and
the less obvious interests of a very complex consumer market). See United States v.
Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D. D.C. 2000).
124 Political philosophers are concerned about making the connections between the
theory of discourse and deliberative democracy and its practice in the real world. See, e.g.,
BOHMAN, supra note 28, at ix-x.
125 This is not to suggest that only lawyers may facilitate or design such new processes,
but that lawyers may be particularly well suited to marry legal formalities and requirements
to more flexible, fair, and participatory modes of political and legal action. Whether lawyers
hinder such processes by focusing too exclusively on legalistic or "due process" concerns
or whether lawyers will learn to utilize their craft to develop flexible and effective new
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VI. QUALrrY OF OuTCOMEs iN DIsPuT RESOLUTION
For many proponents of ADR, however, the Fullerian purpose is not
complexity or diversity of process, but better outcomes. As modem negotiation
theorists urge "win-win" ' 126 solutions, "expanding the pie, before dividing it" or
creating value before claiming it,"12 7 it is useful to recall one early father, far
removed from the legal arena. Vilfredo Pareto, as an economist and sociologist,
is responsible for what we now call "pareto-optimality," an outcome
measurement which searches for the best possible outcome for parties along an
axis of preferences, in which each party is made as well off as possible without
further harm to the other party.128 Some processes may be preferred because of
their tendency to produce more pareto-optimal solutions, as in "strategic
cooperation,"12 9 as studied by game theorists and decision scientists, in
information sharing and trades that are made possible, but the goal is a utilitarian
one of making the parties as well off as possible without unnecessary harm to
each other. This does raise issues, however, about possible harmful externalities
"exported" to others. 130
processes, to produce different kinds of outcomes remains to be seen. For some discussions
of how lawyering constructs may both hinder and facilitate new institutional developments,
see generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 31. See also Susan Sturm, From Gladiators to
Problem Solvers: Connecting Conversations About Women, the Academy and the Legal
Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119, 146-47 (1997); Roger Conner, Community
Oriented Lawyering: An Emerging Approach to Legal Practice, NAT'LINST. OFJUST. J., Jan.
2000, at 26.
12 6 This seems an appropriate time for me to say why "win-win" is not how I would
describe negotiation or conflict resolution. In many disputes, and most legal conflicts it will
be impossible for both (or all) parties actually to "win" something. Consider the criminal
defendant who may bargain for a "better" deal (less incarceration), but who will still be
imprisoned. We aim for solutions that are "better than" some other baseline (an inferior
process or a. more limited scope of possible remedies) so we can improve on what might
otherwise be possible. That does not necessarily mean that all parties will "win" something.
So, I prefer to stay away from the "win-win" language as much as I do not like "win-lose"
either. We are just trying to avoid "lose-lose" (negative sum games) outcomes as much as
possible. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Art and Science of Problem-Solving Negotiation,
TRIAL, June 1999, at 48, 49.
127 LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 41, at 30-33. See generally ROBERT MNOOKIN,
BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DIsPuTEs (2000).
128 E.g., RA1FFA, supra note 23.
129 See, e.g., AXELROD, supra note 22; ADAM BRANDENBURGER & BARRY NALEBUFF,
CO-OPEMrON (1996).
130 Many pareto-optimal solutions between transaction parties, for example, may result
in throwing off costs to others (or decreased taxes paid to the IRS, for example), so a more
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Similarly, much of the underlying and often implicit assumptions of
negotiation and bargaining processes in modem ADR theory draw from the work
of George Caspar Homans, who suggested that even with "universal" Maslovian
needs, 131 human beings have very different preferences and interests which will
often be complementary, not conflicting. 132 Where people desire different things,
trades (or "logrolling," as they say in game theory and politics) 133 are possible
and help to facilitate agreements. Thus, linking these insights about psychology
to legal processes, what might be good for trial (narrowing issues) is actually
dysfunctional for settlement-the more issues, the merrier, for more possible
trades and a settlement point further out on the Pareto frontier. Thus, new legal
process theorists have made use of a different form of social science than did the
first generation of realists-using the human psychology of decisionmaking, not
only by legal elites, but by clients, parties, and others involved in legal disputes.
Work done by psychologists who study creativity, for example, may provide
some insights into how substantive legal solutions are actually crafted. 134
Another little acknowledged "mother" of the field provided one of the
earliest and most interesting empirical studies of how differences in processes do
produce different outcomes. In Settling the Facts: Discretion and Negotiation
in Criminal Court,135 Pamela Utz studied the different plea bargaining processes
of two different criminal court jurisdictions. In one, an adversarial, competitive
model of prosecutors and defense counsel produced a highly conflictual, less
efficient, and less effective system of criminal sentencing and social control. In
broadly defined notion of pareto-optimality that was outcome focused might need to
consider all possible parties affected by an outcome produced by a conflict resolution
process. Consider, for example, children in a divorce or employees in a merger.
131 See generally ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954).
132 Recall Mary Parker Follett's window, my desire for chocolate icing and my
brother's for cake, and the different preferences of those picking at a diverse cocktail mix
(including peanuts, goldfish, pretzels, cashews, and wheatchex). Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 7, at 1620 n.36.
133 The term originates in the fact that it usually requires more than one person to
coordinate "rolling" or moving a log. Martin P. Golding, The Nature of Compromise: A
Preliminary Inquiry, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW AND POLITICs, supra note 38, at 13-14.
13 4 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 47; HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE
THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (1983); MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY:
FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996); TERESA AMABILE,
CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT (1996). One can look to Hart and Sacks' descriptions of legally
creative regimes both in private ordering (percentage of gross commercial leases) and in
statutory schemes and common law developments. See HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at
183.
1 3 5 PAMELA UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL
COURT (1978).
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another court, with another culture, prosecutors, defenders, and eventually, even
the judges, constructed a more "negotiable" justice, with less overcharging, more
realistic and tailored sentences with a philosophy of treatment and reduction of
recidivism, rather than a purely punitive goal. 136 To the extent that the success
of outcomes could be measured, Utz found that a culture of "substantive justice"
obtained in the court with more reasonable and candid bargaining practices than
in the court with more rigid and adversarial routines. Ironically, most of the
impetus for a more "negotiated" plea bargain culture came from a desire to
increase court efficiency and reduce judicial divisiveness. Utz's study of two
courts remains one of the most carefully researched and thickly described
empirical analyses of how different outcomes can result from variations in
process. Her book is also an important and rigorous explication of the advantages
of some non-adjudicative approaches to even the most intractable of our legal
system's problems-the criminal justice system. It is both heartening and
discouraging at the same time to revisit such classic studies when we reflect on
the current irony of less flexibility in the federal courts in determinate sentencing,
as some states more creatively explore the kind of "substantive justice" or
treatment goals described by Utz.137
As scholars and practitioners of dispute resolution become more
sophisticated about designing process to achieve particular outcomes, they have
turned to other fields for insights about how the people inside of institutions
behave.
VII. BARRIERS TO AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DISPUTE AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
I.
Some legal scholars of dispute piocessing and conflict resolution have also
drawn on the work of fathers in cognitive science to help us understand why
resolving conflict is sometimes so difficult. In Kenneth Arrow's edited volume
136 The studied courts were of two counties in California before determinate sentencing
more or less eliminated the possibilities of individualistic and tailored sentences.
137 In the criminal justice field, a growing number of state courts are utilizing multi-
disciplinary "problem solving courts" in drug, gun, family, and domestic violence settings.
E.g., Judith Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How
Courts Are Run, 48 HAsTinGs L.i. 851, 857, 859-62 (1997). See generally Kim Taylor-
Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief Public Defender, 2 J.
INST. STUDY OF LEGAL ETHics 199 (1999); Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831
(2000).
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on Barriers to Conflict Resolution,138 psychologists describe the various
reasoning errors and biased heuristics we use when reasoning alone or with
others in the negotiation process. Distortions in thinking like reactive
devaluation, availability, recency, primacy, loss and risk aversion, as well as
overconfidence and labeling theory tell us that adversarial processes (and much
of legal reasoning) may actually impede good dispute resolution by limiting what
we can hear from the other side and how we can process important
information. 139 These theories and empirical results also help us understand the
importance of curative actions we can take. Mediators who are neutral offerors
of proposals and information can correct for reactive devaluation and reduce
waste in informational distortions. 140 Thus, those who are concerned with
resolving conflicts in either a qualitatively better or more efficient way are
willing to recognize expertises that transcend the law and legal science. The
teachings of our mothers and fathers-that dispute processing, even when legal,
is psychologically and socially situated-are finally being assimilated.
While cognitive science has illuminated some of the "barriers" to conflict
resolution, other theorists and empiricists present a more optimistic picture for
dispute resolution scholars and practitioners. Robert Axelrod's The Evolution of
Cooperation141 demonstrated (admittedly in an artificially constructed computer
tournament of iterated Prisoner Dilemma games) that a highly cooperative
strategy ("tit for tat"-be nice and only retaliate when someone is bad to you,
then quickly forgive) was robust and more successful than more competitive
strategies. This work has led to applications in biology, politics, and law as
researchers seek to understand how cooperative genes and cooperative behaviors
have succeeded in a world posited to be governed principally by self-
interestedness. 142 As Robert Ellickson's empirical study of cooperative neighbors
in a remote California county demonstrated, 143 social norms, in certain
identifiable settings (such as with "iterated" long-term relationships or spatial
proximity) may produce more coordinated and collaborative human interaction
than the assumptions of a Hobbesian man-eat-man competitive Leviathan. So,
138 BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
13 9 See generally MAx BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (4th
ed. 1998); Robert Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 235 (1993); Lee Ross & Constance
Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOT. J. 389 (1991).
140 See generally Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, 1 NEGOT. J. 9 (1985).
141 AXELROD, supra note 22, at 14-28.
142 See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); cf DONALD P. GREEN &
IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994).
143 ELLICKSON, supra note 49.
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now even law and economics scholars are interested in understanding how social
norms (or "informal" rules of social behavior) operate to both control and
facilitate human interactions that somewhat de-centers law and focuses on
informal and social processes that present "opportunities" as well as barriers for
dispute and conflict resolution. 144
The important legacy of this new body of work is to push us to seek
explanations to understand under what conditions cooperation and coordination
can emerge, and under what conditions the barriers to peaceful coexistence or
resolution are more dominant. The field of international conflict resolution, for
example, is a theoretical and empirical battleground for pessimistic barrier
theorists145 and more optimistic opportunity seekers in dispute resolution
mechanisms. 146
VIII. CONCLUSION: LEGACIES AND NEW DIRECTIONS
The field of dispute resolution now demonstrates great intellectual
eclecticism (some would say breadth), coupled with an almost necessary
American pragmatism in its practice and constantly expanding application to new
fields of human endeavor. It should be clear from this brief, and somewhat
idiosyncratic, review of some of our founding concepts that dispute resolution
lies at the center of an intersection of many disciplines and is a discipline and
practice for which the term "applied science" might have been invented. 147 It
remains to be seen what new learning will inform the field and whether that
learning will come predominantly from inside law, legal science, and legal
institutions or, more likely, from without. To the extent that dispute resolution
engages individuals in relation to each other, situated in private and public
144 This "Johnny-come-lately" (if I may call it that) interest of the law and economics
community in social interaction would greatly amuse many of our founding mothers and
fathers, who argued for the primacy of social interactionist models of dispute resolution from
the start. E.g., Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE RuLE OF LAW 171
(Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971).
145 E.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYs INTO THE NEw
NATIONALISM (1993).
146 E.g., WORDS OVER WAR: MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY
CONFLiCr (Melanie C. Greenberg et al. eds., 2000).
147 Indeed, scholars such as Howard Raiffa and Donald Sch6n have both articulated
and engaged in developing both the theory and applications of a variety of these contributing
disciplines to the "applied" domains of dispute resolution, decision science, and policy
formation. E.g., HAMMOND, supra note 23; DONALD SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME
REFLECTION: TowARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE PoLicY CONTROVERSIES (1994).
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relationships, in varied configurations of institutions, we will take our knowledge
from disciplines that focus on both individual and collective action. Thus, I hope
to have illustrated the importance of continuing to remember the intellectual
contributions of our founders from a diversity of fields, so that in paying
attention to past insights (and meticulous empirical work) we will know to search
widely and deeply for new ideas, explanations, and practices.
So, what principles or teachings do we take away from the mothers and
fathers of invention who founded our field, whether wittingly or not? From these
intellectual founders, I take the following major precepts that have greatly
informed the more modem classics in our new canon:
1. Conflict can be good and a potential source of creativity. It is not always
to be resolved or squelched. Conflict handled appropriately can put the parties
(and the rest of us) in a better position than we were before or than we might be
in if left to our own devices (or litigation).
2. Good resolutions of conflicts and problems in the law can occur when
people realize that valuing different things differently is good. Money need not
be a proxy for everything, an assumption that can lead to bitter zero-sum games
and distributive or unnecessary compromise outcomes. More issues and more
trades enhance the likelihood of both the number and quality of possible
resolutions.
3. Different dispute resolution processes produce different kinds of
outcomes. Where there is a need for a decision, with a reasoned and reported
basis, adversarial argumentation may be more important to framing the
resolution. Where there is more than one party or more than one issue
("polycentric" disputes), however, single decision outcomes may not be wise,
and mediation, or a negotiated consensus, rather than a single issue, externally
imposed decision may be better.
4. Settlements or mediated solutions do not have to be compromises or "split
the difference" outcomes. By exploring different values and underlying interests,
creative solutions and integrative outcomes may be possible.
5. Institutionalized choices about processes facilitate an appropriate range of
public and private participation in different kinds and levels of matters and may
legitimate both individual cases and the larger legal and political system in which
those cases are handled. Different dispute institutions will have their own special
competencies, expertises, and morality for handling particular kinds of matters,
which may change over time, developing a kind of "process integrity."
6. Processes produce different kinds of outcomes-there are no universal
processes that will always be better, fairer, or more efficient than others. Dispute
processes are part of the larger culture in which they are embedded and also help
create a community's sense of self. Different kinds of disputes will call for
different kinds of "handling," "managing," or "resolution."
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7. Variations and choices in processes used to resolve particular matters or
to plan future arrangements or- transactions in a society are likely to increase
participation in and legitimacy of the outcomes reached.
8. The human conditions under which peaceful collaboration and
cooperation versus conflict and aggression exist are variable, and we continue to
need more theory and more practice to 'elaborate when we mortal actors can
influence each other's behavior.
In reviewing these contributions of our intellectual forbearers, a question
comes to mind. Is there nothing new under the sun? Can every new insight about
dispute processes be traced to some earlier theorist, scholar, or empiricist? I think
the answer to that question is that humans and legal scholars (sometimes co-
extensive groups) do often "create" ideas without tracing their origins and
considering what intellectual and social forces produce particular questions and
answers at particular times. There may be no new questions to ask, but there are
plenty of new situations and conditions against which to measure and re-consider
pronouncements by earlier generations. In reviewing our mothers and fathers of
invention in the field of dispute resolution, I am both awed by how much they
have given us and challenged by how much has changed that requires new
thinking on these old themes.

